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RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE----JULY 2000 
 
EXCERPTS  FROM THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL   PANEL OF EMINENT 
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994    GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (appointed 
by the Organization of African Unity) 
 
 
The tone of the Report. 
 
We freely acknowledge that it has been impossible to do our task without being 
profoundly, at times helplessly, shaken by the subject matter.  Our experiences in 
Rwanda - the witnesses to whom we listened and the memorial sites we visited – often 
left us emotionally drained.  This is not a report that could be produced with detachment.  
For those seeking bureaucratic assessments or academic treatises, there are other 
sources.  The nature of these events demands a human, intensely personal response, 
and this is very much a personal report from the seven of us.  Readers have a right to 
expect us to be objective and to root our observations and conclusions in the facts of the 
case, and we have striven rigorously to do so.  But they must not expect us to be 
dispassionate. 
 
Colonial roots of ethnic division. 
 
Together [during the colonial era], the Belgians and the Catholic church were guilty of 
what some call “ethnogenesis” - the institutionalisation of rigid ethnic identities for 
political purposes.  The proposition that it was legitimate to politicise and polarise society 
through ethnic cleavages - to “play the ‘ethnic card’ ” for political advantage, as a later 
generation would describe the tactic - became integral to Rwandan public life. The 
Belgian administration introduced identity cards that were issued to every Rwandan, 
declaring each to be either Hutu or Tutsi.  This card system was maintained for over 60 
years and, in a tragic irony, eventually became key to enabling Hutu killers to identify 
during the genocide the Tutsi who were its original beneficiaries.   
 
 
What the World Knew Before the Genocide. 
 
Massacres of the Tutsi began at the very outset of the 1990 civil war when the Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded from Uganda, and, in a real sense, they did 
not end until the RPF victory of July 1994.  After the war, a great debate broke out, and 
continues still , over who knew what about the events unfolding in Rwanda.  In our view, 
this is a phoney debate. The major actors in the drama, the  world that mattered to 
Rwanda -most of its Great Lakes neighbours, the United Nations and the major western 
powers - knew a great deal about what  was happening, and they soon learned that the 
events were being masterminded at the highest level of the state.  They knew that this 
was no senseless case of “Hutu killing Tutsi and Tutsi killing Hutu”, as it was sometimes 
dismissively described.  That world knew that a terrible fate had befallen Rwanda.  
 
There is a record of atrocities, all of which was publicly exposed throughout the early 
1990s by credible human rights organisations. Massacres of Tutsi were carried out in 
October 1990, January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993, 
March 1993, and February 1994. On virtually each occasion, they were carefully 
organised. 
 
The only thing that was not clear was exactly how far the plotters were prepared to go.  
Large numbers of observers had little doubt that a vast, monstrous slaughter was virtually 
inevitable if it could not somehow be deterred. But the fact is that the overwhelming 
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majority of observers did not believe a genocide would be launched.  More precisely, they 
could not bring themselves to harbour such a belief. As members of the Panel wrestled 
with this vexing question, we came finally to understand that it was literally unthinkable 
for most people to believe that genocide was in fact possible; it was simply beyond 
comprehension that it could be possible. 
 
 
General Dallaire’s “genocide fax”. 
 
On 11 January 1994, General Dallaire, commander of the UN mission to Rwanda 
[UNAMIR],  sent his controversial “genocide fax” to his superior, General Baril, at the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.  It was prompted by an informant,  
a militia commander known in UN correspondence only as Jean-Pierre.  “…he has been 
ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali.  He suspects it is for their extermination.  Example 
he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.” Jean-Pierre 
offered to take UNAMIR officials to caches of guns. The interahamwe, the militia attached 
to the President’s party,   had 1,700 men scattered in groups of 40 around the capital, 
each of whom had been trained in “discipline, weapons, explosives, close combat and 
tactics.... They hoped to...provoke a civil war.”  On 12 January, Dallaire received a 
response from Iqbal Riza in New York, writing over the signature of his superior, Kofi 
Annan, head of UN peacekeeping operations. In it he denied Dallaire permission to seize 
the arms caches revealed by Jean-Pierre.   
 
 
The Responsibility of the “International Community” 
 
The central argument of this report is that for 150 years, the outside world played a 
central part in carving out the building blocks that built to the genocide.  This role 
extended all the way back to the  racism of the first European explorers, to Belgian 
colonial policy,  to Catholic church support for “demographic democracy” under a Hutu 
military dictatorship, to the Structural Adjustment Programme imposed by western 
financial institutions and to the legitimising of an ethnic dictatorship   by France, the 
United States and many  international  development aid agencies.  In our very strong 
view, the world carries  a heavy responsibility for the events in Rwanda.  There was an 
honourable and inestimably useful way in which the world might have discharged that 
responsibility,  and human rights groups and a small number of UN officials tried 
frantically  to get it to do so. Instead, world leaders chose to play politics and pinch 
pennies as hundreds of thousands of innocent Rwandans needlessly died.  
 
 
The Preventable Genocide.  
 
If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have 
to happen.  The simple, harsh truth is that the genocide was not inevitable, and it would 
have been relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to 6 April  1994 and then  to 
mitigate the destruction significantly once it began.  In the words of one expert, “This was 
the most easily preventable genocide imaginable.”   
 
The obvious, necessary response to the situation in Rwanda was a serious international 
military force to deter the killers. This Panel wants to go on record as sharing the 
conviction of UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire: "The killings could have been 
prevented if there had been the international will to accept the costs of doing so..."  
Virtually every authority we know  believes that a larger, better-equipped and toughly 
mandated force could have played a critical role either  in deterring the conspiracy 
entirely or, at least, in causing the plotters to modify or stall their plans and in significantly 
reducing the number of deaths.  
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Rather than respond with appropriate force, the opposite happened, spurred by the 
murders of ten Belgian Blue Berets and Belgium's withdrawal of its remaining troops.  
Exactly two weeks after the genocide began - following strenuous lobbying for total 
withdrawal led by Belgium and Britain, and with American UN Ambassador Madeleine 
Albright advocating the most token of forces and the United States adamantly refusing to 
accept publicly that a full-fledged, Convention-defined genocide was in fact taking place - 
the Security Council made the astonishing decision to reduce the already inadequate 
UNAMIR force to a derisory 270 men.  
 
Today, it seems barely possible to believe.  The international community actually chose 
to abandon the Tutsi of Rwanda at the very moment when they were being exterminated.  
 
 
The Double Standard. 
 
On April 8 and 9,  1994, France sent 500 soldiers to evacuate French citizens and the 
Akazu members who led the genocide conspiracy.  Dallaire’s UN troops were 
immediately ordered by the Secretariat in New York,  under strong pressure from western 
countries,  to work with the French to evacuate foreign nationals rather than protect 
threatened Rwandans.  
 
 Equally startling were the guidelines Dallaire was given…  “You should make every effort 
not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate,” the April 9 cable 
from Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza stated, “but [you] may exercise your discretion to do [so] 
should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals.  This should not, repeat 
not, extend to participating in possible combat except in self-defence.”  This double 
standard seems to us outrageous.  No such instructions were ever given to Dallaire about 
protecting innocent Rwandan civilians.  He was never explicitly directed that the Blue 
Helmets should protect such civilians and could fight in self-defence if attacked while 
doing so.  He was never told, “exercise your discretion...to act beyond your mandate” 
when it came to Rwandans.  On the contrary, every time he raised the issue, he was 
specifically instructed not to go beyond the rigidly circumscribed mandate approved by 
the Security Council under any circumstances.  Is there a conclusion we can draw from 





The Role of France. 
 
 Immediately upon the RPF invasion from Uganda into Rwanda in October 1990, the 
French government committed itself to defend and support the Habyarimana regime.  
Among the usual variety of French motives, francophonie unquestionably played a key 
role.  Mittérrand himself,  Admiral Jacques Lanxade told the 1998 parliamentary inquiry, 
“considered that the RPF aggression was a determined action against a francophone 
zone”  France made itself the de facto public relations agent for the Rwanda government 
in international forums… automatically dismissing the ever-increasing stories of serious 
human rights abuses perpetrated by that government. Medecins Sans Frontieres  makes 
the indisputable point that “France supported the regime of President Habyarimana even 
though racism was the pillar of all the policies of his government.”  
 
The importance of this role can hardly be overestimated. France’s unequivocal public 
support constituted a major disincentive for the radical Akazu faction in  President 
Habyarimana’s entourage to make concessions or to think in terms of compromise. The 
French chose not to use its singular influence at the highest echelons of Rwandan 
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society to demand an end to government-initiated violence, a decision that sent its own 
clear  message. Those guilty of terrible human rights violations drew the obvious lesson:  
they could get away with anything.  
 
 French forces were to remain for the three turbulent years  following  the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front’s 1990 invasion from Uganda. France did all it could to prevent the victory 
of the RPF by shoring up Habyarimana.  Throughout these years, French officials worked 
intimately with senior Rwandan government officials while French officers became an 
integral part of the military hierarchy, involved in virtually every aspect of the civil war that 
broke out after the incursion.  Throughout this period, the French army worked closely 
with Rwandans widely known to be associated with, if not guilty of, murder and other 
human rights abuses.  
 
During these years, France was also one of Rwanda’s major sources of military supplies. 
Officially, France imposed an arms embargo on April 8, 1994, two days after the plane 
crash  that killed President Habyarimana and triggered the genocide. The facts indicate 
that France provided arms or permitted them to be provided to the Rwandan forces right 
through until June, the third month of the genocide.  
 
As for this Panel, the indisputable facts of the case lead us to several irresistible 
conclusions. First, until the genocide began, the French government was far and away 
the most steadfast ally and public defender of an elite it knew beyond any doubt was 
guilty of massive human rights abuses. Second, as a matter of deliberate policy, it failed 
to use its undoubted influence to end such behaviour. Third, we find it  impossible to 
justify  most of the actions of the French state that we have just described. Four, the 
position  of the French government- that it was in no way responsible for the genocide in 
Rwanda-  is entirely unacceptable to this Panel.  
 
Two months into the genocide, the French government decided to send troops to 
Rwanda; this action, known as Operation Turquoise,  led to the carving  out of a safe 
zone in the south-west of the country. Analysts calculate that in the course of their 
mission, the French force did save not the "tens of thousands" of people proclaimed by 
President Mittérrand, but probably some 10,000 -15,000 Tutsi, a feat that can only be 
applauded.  But beyond any doubt, their other task was to give support to the interim 
government. Most of the genocidaire regime, large numbers of high-ranking military 
officers, as well as thousands of heavily armed interahamwe and the majority of the 
Rwandan forces (now called ex-FAR) managed to escape the inexorable Rwandan 
Patriotic Front advance by retreating to the convenience of the safe zone. Once it was 
clear the RPF could not be halted, France  facilitated the escape of much of the Hutu 
Power leadership, the Hutu radicals, into Zaire. 
 
Africa continues to pay dearly for this development to the present moment. The 
genocidaires were able to survive to fight another day. This was beyond question the 
single most significant post-genocide event in the entire Great Lakes region, launching a 
chain of events that eventually engulfed the entire area and beyond in conflict.  
 
French authorities permitted ex-FAR soldiers to move back and forth between the safe 
zone and Zaire without hindrance.  Sometimes the French helped them on their way; they 
were seen refuelling army trucks before they took off for Zaire with the goods looted from 
local homes and businesses.  In Zaire itself, French soldiers drove their Rwandan 
colleagues around in official vehicles, and on at least one occasion. French soldiers 
delivered  ten tons of food to ex-FAR troops at Goma.  
 
Throughout this period, the ex-FAR continued to receive weapons inside the French zone 
via Goma airport in adjacent Zaire. Although French officials have consistently 
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maintained that all arms shipments to the Habyarimana government ended right after his 
murder, the evidence tells a different story.  
 
Through July, August and September, according to UN officials, the French military flew a 
raft of genocidaires out of Goma to unidentified destinations.  None of these men had 
shown an iota of remorse.  On the contrary, they were refreshingly candid about their 
next steps.  They were going back to finish the “work” they had not quite completed.  
Thanks to the unanticipated opportunity provided in substantial part by France, they could 




The Role of the United States. 
 
As for the American role in the Rwandan genocide, it was brief, powerful and inglorious.  
There is virtually no controversy about this.  Not only do authorities on the subject agree 
with this statement, so now does the American president who was responsible for the 
policies he belatedly finds so reprehensible.  Unlike France, America has formally 
apologized for its failure to prevent the genocide, although President Clinton insists that 
his failure was a function of ignorance. It was not.  It was a function of domestic politics 
and geopolitical indifference.  
 
The problem was not that the American were ignorant about Rwanda.  The problem was 
that nothing was at stake for the United States in Rwanda.  
 
Following the deaths in 1993 of 18 US soldiers in Somalia, the American government 
made it a policy to weaken subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. The Rwandan 
mission was the first to be affected. What makes this episode even more disturbing is the 
way it was distorted by virtually the entire American establishment in both political parties.  
The tactic, simply, was to blame the UN for what had in fact been a purely American 
disaster. Only a few Americans ever learned the truth.  The disastrous  US operation had 
been planned and launched entirely without the knowledge of UN officials. 
No nation did more than the US to undermine the effectiveness of  UNAMIR [the UN 
Military Mission to Rwanda].  Throughout the genocide American machinations at the 
Security Council repeatedly undermined all attempts to strengthen the UN military 
presence in Rwanda; in the end, not a single new soldier or piece of military hardware 
representing the United Nations reached the country before the genocide ended.  
 
Looking at the record, an American chronicler of the Rwandan genocide bitterly 
concludes that “anybody who believes the words ‘never again’ is deluding themselves 
dangerously about future holocausts.” In early 2000, as this report was being written, the 
leading Republican presidential candidate was asked by a television interviewer what he 
would do as president “if, God forbid, another Rwanda should take place”. George W. 
Bush replied:  “We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide 
outside our strategic interest….I would not send the United States troops into Rwanda.”   
 
 
The UN Plays into the Hands of Rogue Elements. 
 
The failure of the international community to stand up to Hutu Power reinforced the culture of 
impunity that further empowered the Hutu radicals.  In a terrible irony, the very 
feebleness of the UN's  intervention emboldened the  radicals, persuading them  that they 
had nothing to fear from the outside world regardless of what they did.  
 
  A perverse dogma had somehow taken hold  in the Security Council and Secretariat 
during the months of March to June 1994.  It was widely understood that the Hutu 
Excerpts 6
radicals  were conspiring to drive UNAMIR out of Rwanda. Nevertheless, the Security 
Council insisted that continued support for the mission be contingent on implementation 
of the Arusha peace agreement, an irresistible incentive for the Hutu radicals to escalate 
their efforts to undermine the accord. In a history teeming with incomprehensible 
decisions and events, this action by the Security Council seems to us to rank among the 
most bizarre.  Frankly, we can still hardly believe it happened. Yet it has re-emerged 
again this year [1990] as a precondition for the new UN mission to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The mission is authorized only if all the warring parties in DRC 
agree to a ceasefire and to cooperate in future negotiations. But if they do so, as OAU 
spokespeople cynically ask, why is the UN needed? The time a robust UN force is most 
required is precisely when there is no agreement and no good faith among the parties. 
Yet in DRC, the Security Council has again bowed to the dogma  that had been so 
completely discredited in Rwanda.  
 
 
The Role of the Security Council 
 
 On 21 April, two weeks into the genocide, the Security Council passed a resolution stating that it 
was "appalled at the ensuing large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children."  It then voted unanimously to 
reduce UNAMIR to a token force of about 270 personnel and to limit its mandate accordingly.  




The Role of the Church 
 
During the months of the genocide, the Hutu leadership of the Catholic and Anglican 
churches did not abandon their traditional close relationship with the Hutu establishment.  
They were anything but neutral in their sympathies.  It is not too much to say they were at 
the very least indirectly complicit in the genocide for failing over the years -- and even 
during the genocide itself -- to dissociate themselves categorically from race hatred, to 
condemn ethnic manipulation and to denounce publicly human rights violations.  Some 
believe that “Church pulpits could have provided an opportunity for almost the entire 
population to hear a strong message that could have prevented the genocide.  Instead, 
the leaders remained silent.  Being the clearest embodiment of moral authority in the 
communities,”  this silence was easily interpreted by ordinary Christians as an implicit 
endorsement of the killings.  
 
The church leaders did nothing to discourage the killings. Not even the Pope’s demand 
for an end to the killings swayed his representatives in Rwanda.  It was five weeks into 
the genocide before four Catholic bishops, together with Protestant leaders, produced 
anything remotely like a conciliatory document, and even then they could bring 
themselves to do no more than blame each side equally and call on both to “stop the 
massacres.” The word “genocide” was never mentioned.  
 
Among the many sources of particular bitterness felt by the post-genocide Rwandan government 
has been the failure of the Roman Catholic church… that still commands the allegiance of almost 
two-thirds of the Rwandan people to acknowledge any collective responsibility for the genocide. 
Both the Catholic and Anglican archbishops had been personally close to Habyarimana and acted 
largely as Hutu Power apologists during the genocide.  The latter fled to exile and is shunned by his 
church; his successor has publicly apologized on behalf of the Anglican church for its role in the 
genocide.   
 
Nothing similar has emanated from the Catholic hierarchy in Rwanda. The Rwandan government 
has repeatedly demanded a formal apology from the Vatican, but with no success . We regret that 
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in his February 2000  apology for the past mistakes of the church, the Pope chose not to include, or 
even apparently to allude to, Rwanda.  But it is by no means too late for him to do so, and to urge 
his Rwandan flock to confess whatever guilt they carry and to actively seek reconciliation with their 
fellow citizens.  In our view, this would constitute a major contribution to healing in the country.  
 
 
The Major Villains. 
 
  Large numbers of outside agencies must take a certain responsibility for Rwanda’s tragedy -- the 
churches, the international financial institutions, all the aid organizations that loved operating in 
Habyarimana’s Rwanda and whose largesse made possible the increased coercive capacity of the 
state prior to the genocide, and every nation that ignored the overtly ethnic basis of Rwandan 
governance and turned a blind eye to the ethnic-based massacres that had begun in 1990.  
 
 Nevertheless, beyond these, the evidence is clear that there are a small number of  major  actors  
whose intervention could directly have  prevented, halted or reduced the slaughter.  They include 
France in Rwanda itself; the United States at the Security Council, loyally supported by Britain; and 
Belgium, which fled from Rwanda and then tried to have UNAMIR dismantled altogether after the 
genocide had begun. In the bitter words of UNAMIR Commander General Dallaire, echoed by his 
Belgian second-in-command, Colonel Marchal, the “international community has blood on its 
hands”.   
 
 
  How Many Tutsi Were Killed? 
 
  In the nature of the event, it has always been difficult to establish the numbers killed in 
the genocide.  Serious authorities disagree by hundreds of thousands of deaths -- a quite 
remarkable variation.  The highest persuasive figure for Tutsi killed seems to be 800,000, 
the very lowest, 500,000.  Unfortunate as it is, the truth is that we have no way of being 
certain.  The fact is that even if the most conservative figure is used, it still means that 
over three-quarters of the entire population registered as Tutsi were systematically killed 






The price of this betrayal  by the international community was paid by countless Rwandans, 
overwhelmingly Tutsi, who will forever remain anonymous to the rest of the world.  In contrast, none 
of the key actors on the Security Council or in the Secretariat responsible for this betrayal has ever 
paid any kind of price. No heads have rolled. No resignations have been demanded. No one has 
resigned on a matter of principle. Many of their careers have flourished greatly since 1994. Instead 




The Failure to Disarm the Genocidaires 
 
We should emphasize that the role of Hutu Power leaders in the Kivu refugee camps of 
eastern Zaire after the genocide was not remotely clandestine.  Their activities were 
public knowledge, because they spoke about their plans publicly and because they 
carried out their terrorist tactics openly. The ex-FAR received arms shipments in the 
camps, conducted military training exercises, recruited combatants and (in terms used in 
documents later found in one of the camps) planned a ‘final victory’ and a definitive 
solution to Hutu-Tutsi  antagonisms.  
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In response, the RPF, its neighbouring governments and the OAU called for the urgent 
repatriation of all legitimate refugees and the immediate separation and disarmament of 
armed elements operating among the refugees. The Security Council refused to act. As a 
result of this deliberate policy choice by the international community,  the camps 
remained under the control of unrepentant armed killers who used them as bases to 
launch raids across the nearby border into Rwanda. This triggered a series of stunning 
developments, most notably two successive wars centred on Zaire/Congo, whose impact 
continues as we write this report.   
 
 
Supplying Arms to Central Africa. 
 
China is the leading supplier of arms to Central Africa, the US second, and France is 
third; in southern Africa, Russia is the leading supplier, with the US and France tied for 
second. Being among the Big Three suppliers of arms to poor countries at war seems to 
us highly dubious distinctions, and at least one branch of the US government concurs. In 
late 1999 the US State Department described the impact of arms trafficking to "the 
politically fragile Central Africa/Great Lakes region" to be "catastrophic." The State 
Department concluded, however, that it would "continue unabated for the foreseeable 
future" since there was not sufficient "sustained political will on the part of the regional 
and international leaders" to restrict it.   
 
 
Rwandans Inherits their Killers’ Debt 
 
Perhaps there was no better reflection of the world’s shabby treatment of post-genocide 
Rwanda than the matter of the debt burden incurred by the Habyarimana government.  The 
major source of the unpaid debt was the weapons the regime had purchased for the war 
against the RPF, which had then been turned against innocent Tutsi during the genocide.  
 
Incredibly enough, the new government was deemed responsible for repaying to those 
multilateral and national lenders the debt accrued by its predecessors.  The common-
sense assumption that Rwanda deserved and could not recover without special 
treatment, that the debt would have been wiped out more or less automatically, had no 
currency  in the world of international finance.  Instead of Rwanda receiving vast sums of 
money as reparations by those who had failed to stop the tragedy, it in fact owed those 
same sources a vast sum of money.  
 
 
The RPF and Human Rights Abuses 
 
Accusations against the RPF for human rights violations, often of massive proportions, 
have been heard since the incursion of 1990. Having scrutinized carefully the  sources 
available, we have been  persuaded by    the evidence that at least some and perhaps 
many of these charges are true, that such violations  took place before, during and after 
the genocide, and that they have included the period since late 1996 when Rwandan 
troops began hunting genocidaires throughout central Africa. On very many occasions, 
RPF soldiers have been guilty of killing civilians, often in large numbers, although exactly 
how many is in serious dispute.  Hutu Power representatives consistently  claim that the 
RPF have killed hundreds of thousands of Hutu in Rwanda in the past decade, 
constituting what they call  a "second genocide";  the evidence, however, does not justify 
this accusation, which more plausibly should be considered simple propaganda.  A UN 
fact-finding body has also raised the possibility that RPF forces were guilty of genocide in 
Zaire/ Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, but it is impossible to verify this charge. 
Finally, there is evidence that the numbers of RPF killings and human rights abuses in 
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general have declined significantly in the past year as Hutu Power attacks from the 
Congo have been repelled.  
 
 
The Organization  of African  Unity.  
 
Throughout April, May, June and July 1994,  the OAU, like the UN, failed to call genocide 
by its rightful name and refused to take sides between the genocidaires (a name they 
would not use) and the RPF or to accuse the one side of being genocidaires. The 
slaughter was denounced  as  “carnage and bloodletting” or “massacres and wanton 
killings” but the condemnation was strangely impartial; no group was condemned by 
name, implying that the two combatants were equally culpable. Both parties were urged 
to agree to a ceasefire and to return to the negotiating table.  
 
Under the circumstances of the time, this Panel finds the silence of the OAU and a large 
majority of African heads  constituted a shocking moral failure.  
  
 
Who Will Fight for Africa? 
 
During the same decade that African leaders repeatedly called upon foreign countries to 
send in their troops or to offer logistic support to African troops, more than a dozen new 
or protracted conflicts flared across the continent. Three-quarters of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa were engaged in armed conflict or confronted by a significant threat from 
armed groups during 1999. Many of these were between state governments, not least the 
very war in central Africa that the Lusaka Agreement for central Africa is intended to 
resolve. Apart from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, direct military participants in 
that war include the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi pitted against the 
governments of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad; several other governments have 
lesser military involvements. Among them, they also support a large array of rebel 
groups, including those who are guilty of genocide and other crimes against humanity. 
Somehow or other, despite their poverty, all these governments as well as other African 
governments engaged in costly full-scale wars, have found the resources they need. 
None of them has needed the assistance of the United Nations to do so.  
 
Military expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa totalled nearly $11 billion in 1999.  Excluding 
South Africa, spending on arms in the region increased by about 14% at a time when its 
economic growth rose by less than 1% in real terms. Armed exports to the region nearly 
doubled in the year 1999, as different factions fought not only over territory but for control 
of valuable mineral resources.  
 
Such information does not make the OAU’s case for foreign logistic support for African 
troops  more persuasive. Already in the past decade or so a backlash has grown among 
donor countries and agencies against providing assistance to poor countries that were 
spending a substantial portion of their meagre budgets on defence expenditures. A 
similar backlash is surely inevitable by industrialized nations against committing military 
resources to African countries for peacekeeping missions because their own military 
resources are tied up in inter-African wars. Surely potential donors will legitimately 
question why it can be considered their responsibility to fund operations that African 
governments cannot afford because they are overburdened warring against each other.  
 
We repeat our conviction that Africa must bear substantial responsibility for African 
challenges and crises. Beyond the outside world, it was after all certain Rwandan 
Africans who launched the genocide against other Africans in Rwanda, and it is African 
governments that are, at great cost, fighting a war in DRC.  African governments 
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therefore surely have an inescapable obligation to cease fighting each other and to 





Total Rwandan government expenditures in 1998 were about US$375 million; to put this 
figure in some context, the budget of Austria, a country with a similar  population, 
included expenditures of US$ 60 billion,  160 times greater than Rwanda’s.  Even then, 
Rwanda’s revenues, US$310 million,  were not nearly adequate to cover expenditures.   
Further, domestic revenues contributed just two-thirds of this amount; fully one-third 
came from external sources.  Finally, the military received in 1998 between US$73 and 
85 million (depending on sources), while servicing the external debt cost another US$40 
million.  That means that almost  one-third of a very small budget went to  the military and 
the debt.  
 
Rwanda is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign agencies, governments and NGOs for 
any number of programs that are crucial to rehabilitation, reconciliation and development; 
these include assistance to victims of the genocide, demobilisation and reintegration of 
soldiers, civil service reform and “the establishment of governance institutions.”   
 
The important truth that while Rwanda is very poor, it is by no means simply another poor 
African country.  Many of its problems have either been created or seriously exacerbated 
by the genocide, the subsequent war in central Africa, and the continuing determination 
of former genocidaires, whom the international community refused to disarm, to carry on 
the fight to destabilise the present government.  
 
Rwanda is not just another country.  Too many people, it seems to us, deal with Rwanda 
as if the genocide were already an ancient story that should be relegated to the history 
books and that it is time for the nation to move on.  We strongly repudiate this view… 
There is no statute of limitation for those guilty of genocide, and there is no statute of 
limitation on its memories and ramifications.  The consequences of an event of such 
enormity continue to be felt, individually and collectively, for decades.  
 
Pretending that ethnic divisions do not exist  and will not be recognised, as the 
government of Rwanda insists on doing, is an answer that satisfies no one.  These 
divisions  exist and  everybody knows they exist.   Many of the government’s actions 
exacerbate the divisions, the war in DRC reinforces them, and the political turbulence 
within the government keeps them in the public eye.    By themselves, all the 
reconciliation projects in the world will do nothing to change this situation.  
 
Rwanda is unlikely ever to be an ethnic-free  nation, but this need not be a cause for 
despair.   Diversity, properly appreciated, strengthens a society, and unity in diversity is 
the mark of a strong nation. We believe Rwandans should  acknowledge ethnicity for 
what it is – legitimate, value-free distinctions between groups of people who share and 
accept a larger identity in common.  There can be Rwandan Hutu and Rwandan Tutsi 
and  Rwanda Twa without ascribing superior or inferior value implications to those 
groupings.  
